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NOTE
LABOR LAW-AFFIRMATIVE ORDERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD-ORDERS TO DISESTABLISH COMPANY-SUPPORTED
UNIoNs.-Relief from the five unfair labor practices' which the
National Labor Relations Act is designed to exterminate is gained
through "cease and desist" orders of the National Labor Relations
Board, supplemented by "such affirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this act."2 Reinstatement of discharged employees and resti-
tution of pay have been the most frequent type of affirmative action.8
These orders to amend violations of Section 8 (3) and (4) usually
require reinstatement of the employee, and to make whole for any loss
of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination, without prejudice to
seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed. A recent
adaptation and broadening of this order has been found necessary in
the cases of "runaway" mills and factories; here the Board has
required payment of transportation expenses of any employee and his
family who is forced to move to obtain reinstatement, which reinstate-
ment must be to former positions or to positions corresponding to those
originally held, whether in the old plant or in the new.4 Affirmative ac-
tion under Section 8 (5) has also been required constantly. Here the
guilty respondent company is ordered to bargain collectively with the
chosen representatives upon request to do so "as the exclusive repre-
sentative of its employees * * * in respect to rates of pay, hours of
"National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT.. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. (1937 Supp.)
§§ 151-166, provides: Section 8: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-
"(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7.
"(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.
"(3) By discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.
"(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
"(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)."
2 Section 10(c): "* * * If upon all the testimony taken the Board shall be
of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its
findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an
order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
Act * * *"
3 As in Agwilines, Inc., (1936) 2 N.L.R.B. 1, 19, aff'd, Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB,
87 F. (2d) 146, 151 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936); for cases see NLRB SFcoND ANNUAL
REPORT (1937) 148-154; The Labor Board and the Courts (1938) 32 ILL. L.
REv. 568, 577-582.
4S & K Knee Pants Company, Inc. (1937) 2 N.L.R.B. 940; Herbert Robinson
and Otto A. Golluber, Co-Partners Doing Business Under the Firm and
Style of Robinson and Golluber, (1936) 2 N.L.R.B. 460; Remington Rand,
Inc. (1937) 2 N.L.R.B. 626. In NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d)
862 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) the court refused to enforce that part of the Board's
order requiring transportation costs, on the ground that this was punitive.
employment, and other conditions of employment. ' With all of these
orders, except transportation expenses, the courts have found no
difficulty.
The question of the scope of affirmative action, however, has
arisen very decisively in supplementing "cease and desist" enforce-
ment of Section 8 (1) and (2) by orders to "disestablish" certain
company unions; "disestablishment" meaning not merely the with-
drawal of support and sponsorship, but dissolution of the company
union, or at the least no further recognition of it as a bargaining
agency. In the Greyhound Cases,- the Supreme Court reversed the
action of the circuit courts of appeals that refused to enforce orders
to disestablish; in NLRB v. Remington Rand7 the circuit court of
appeals again refused to enforce disestablishment.
A company union was started in NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc. by the employers without any request from the employees
or any demand for organization, the general managers even drawing
up the petitions which the employees later circulated, "asking for" a
union." Elections were ostensibly to be conducted by the employees
but were company-controlled at every step. The company drew up the
by-laws and the regulations which were never presented to the entire
group of employees for approval; it paid all the expenses; it gave and
described the functions of the union and controlled all meetings and
discussions. Control of the union was through a "joint reviewing com-
mittee" composed of half employees and half management, the chair-
man being a company executive, the regional manager. The union was
merely an agency to handle individual grievances, and even then no
matter could be discussed by the joint reviewing board if the depart-
ment head refused to submit it. Thus no collective bargaining was
possible. This was clearly a violation of Section 8 (1).9 The company
attempted to thwart the formation of a bona fide union, finally dis-
charging five men for union activity, thus violating Section 8 (2) and
(3)?O The Board issued orders to cease and desist from these unfair
practices, and also demanded the disestablishment of the company
union. The fact situation and Board order in NLRB v. Pacific Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. were similar, except that there were fewer "formal
provisions" of company control in the constitution and by-laws, em-
ployer control being none the less effective. On appeal to the respec-
5Recent cases are NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A.
2d, 1938); National Motor Bearing Company, (1938) 5 N.L.R.B., No. 66; The
Jacobs Bros. Co., Inc. (1938) 5 N.L.R.B., No. 87; Zenite Metal Corporation
(1938) 5 N.L.R.B., No. 73.
6 NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 58 Sup. Ct 571 (1938) rev'g
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 91 F. (2d) 178 (C.C.A. 3d,
1937) ; NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 58 Sup. Ct. 577 (1938) rev'g
NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 91 F. (2d) 458 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937).
194 F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
8 A letter from the General Manager of Maintenance stated that "The manage-
ment has decided to set up a plan of employee representatives * * * It is to
our interest to pick out employees to serve on the committee who will work
for the interest of the company and will not be radical." A sample of the
petition which the employees should sign asking for a union accompanied the
letter. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., (1935) 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 7, 8.
9 Supra note 1.
: Ibid.
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tive circuit courts of appeals in both cases, the disestablishment orders
were disallowed, each court holding that the order outlawed the com-
pany union in advance of an election and without a hearing. The
Supreme Court, however, relied upon the Railway Labor Casesa that
employer recognition of a company union might be enjoined and the
union disestablished, if necessary to prevent interference with the
rights secured to employees by the statute.
The company unions which the Board ordered disestablished in
the Remington Rand Case were created as a result of "back-to work"
associations during a strike by employees in six plants. This strike
had been precipitated by a refusal to negotiate in good faith with the
"joint protective committee" which represented a clear majority of the
workers. It was broken by typical ruthless strike-breaking tactics: an
intense propaganda drive, threats to move the plants, strike breakers
from four leading strike-breaking agencies, spies, bribery, and mis-
statements, coupled with a "back-to-work" movement which the Board
had no doubt was sponsored by the employers.32 Thereafter the back-
to-work associations in each plant were formed into company unions
with company sponsorship. The court based its refusal to allow the
order of disestablishment on the two grounds that it did not add any-
thing to the order which already required the respondent to withdraw
all recognition from the unions, and that it was "quite likely to impress
an unfair stigma on these unions.'" 3
The problem before us is the permissive scope of these affirmative
orders. It is first necessary to reexamine the policies and purpose of
the National Labor Relations Act, and the intent of Congress. One of
the policies stated in Section 1 of the Act is to protect the "exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing."'1 4 Section 7
enumerates the rights of employees under the Act, including that
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations."' 5 Section 8 specifies the unfair practices
-Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930); Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No.
40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). In the first case, the Railway Co. was ordered to
completely "disestablish" the Association of Clerical Employees "because they
were shown to be motivated to oppose demands of the Railway Brotherhood
and to promote another organization more favorable to the employers. It was
held that the aim of the Railway Labor Act was to insure freedom from inter-
ference with selection of representatives, and therefore that enforcement
therof was contemplated.
2 N.L.R.B. 626, 664-666.
" NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 870 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
14 Section 1: "* * * It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection."
25 Section 7: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
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from which labor shall be protected.6 The policy of the act, in a word,
is to permit and foster real collective bargaining between labor and
capital. This is substantiated by Congressional intent. Senator Wagner
said, when speaking on the bill in the Senate, that it meant the "Prohi-
bition of certain unfair practices which are intended to make the
worker a free man, to decide for himself whether he wants an organi-
zation, and if he wants one, what the type of organization shall be."'m
The Senate Committee reported on the bill that its objectives were (1)
to promote peace in industry by developing collective bargaining and
allowing employees to organize freely and to deal with employers
through representatives of their own choosing, and (2) to procure
economic adjustment by encouraging "That equality of bargaining
power which is a prerequisite to equality of opportunity and freedom
of contract.""' The report of the House Committee on the proposed
bill is even clearer, for it states that such affirmative action is to be
taken as will effectuate the policies of the act enumerated in Section 1,
that the action will need to be adapted to the needs of the individual
case, and specifically that it includes "refraining from bargaining with
an organization corrupted by unfair labor practice."' The general
policy and intent of the Act are clear.
The most important problem is to ascertain when such a factual
situation exists that affirmative action is necessary in addition to an
order to cease and desist. By legislative and administrative law require-
ment, the Board may make no order except upon findings of fact that
unfair labor practices are being or have been engaged in, ° but its
findings are conclusive when there is any evidence to sustain them.3
In this situation, such'evidence is found in the relation between the
employer and the union. Mere status as a company union is not suffi-
cient to warrant an order of disestablishment. The Act does not, and
never was intended to outlaw the company union. The House Commit-
tee in its report, after stating that company unions were not pro-
hibited, added "if by the term is meant an organization of workers
confined by their own volition to the boundaries of a particular plant
or employer," and that "It is of the essence that the right of employees
to self-organization and to join or assist labor organizations should not
be reduced to a mockery by the imposition of employer controlled labor
organizations."' 2 The dangers and defects of the company union were
UoSupra Note 1.
17 79 CONG. Rzc. 7574 (1935).
18 Report of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, SEN. REP. No. 573,
p. 1-4, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
19Report of the House Committee on Labor, H. R. REP. No. 1147, p. 3, 23,
74th Cong. 1st Sess. The whole statement is the following: "And to take such
affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the bill; i.e., as defined in
section 1, to encourage the practice of collective bargaining and to protect the
exercise by the worker of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing. The orders will of course
be adapted to the needs of the individual case; they may include such mat-
ters as refraining from collective bargaining, posting of appropriate bulletins,
refraining from bargaining with an organization corrupted by unfair labor
practices. The most frequent form of affirmative action required in cases of
this type is specifically provided for * * *" (p. 23).
-0 Section 10(c): *** The Board shall state its findings of fact."
21 Section 10(e): *** The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported
by evidence, shall be conclusive * * *"
- Report of the House Committee on Labor, supra note 19, pp. 17, 18.
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also brought out in the Senate discussion on the bill: first, that it is
normally confined to a single unit; secondly, that the employees' choice
of representatives is usually limited to those working there; and
thirdly, that it is supported in whole or part by the employer. 3
An aggravated example of the more common types of employer
interference is found in the Greyhound Bus Cases. Here were (1) ini-
tial creation of the union and continued sponsorship thereof; (2) dic-
tation of by-laws and regulations; (3) financial support; (4) no dues
or assessments; (5) leadership through supervisory employees; (6) all
functions dictated by management; (7) no problems discussed without
consent of the management; (8) no referendum by employees or meet-
ings for purpose of instructing their representatives; (9) intimidation
of employees into membership. 24 The board found "the words com-
bination, interference, and support are separately inadequate to de-
scribe the management's part in the association:" There was "com-
plete subjugation and control." Disestablishment was the only remedy
because "The control of the management so permeates every aspect
of its operations that the Association and the management cannot be
regarded as separate entities so as to require only the cessation of the
latter's domination, interference, and support."2 5 Here we are given
two criteria to judge whether disestablishment is necessary: (1) if the
union disestablished is so constituted as to be incapable of functioning
as a bona fide bargaining agency 2- and (2) if there has been so much
interference that the union does not exist apart from the management.
A third criterion is hinted at in Atlanta Woolen Mills2 where there
was little direct interference, but the Good Will Club, a mild form of
company union, published a notice on the company bulletin boards
that a closed shop agreement had been entered into with it; this the
company did not deny, and thereby caused a great influx of member-
ship. The Board at first ordered that a notice be posted that there was
no closed shop agreement, but on a second hearing s ordered disestab-
lishment as the only effective remedy to restore the situation as it was
before the company interfered with the self-organization of its em-
ployees, for otherwise the company union would not have attained such
membership. This criterion is really one which investigates ill-gotten
gains of the employer and refuses to permit him to keep them. Closely
linked with this test is the oft-quoted reason for disestablishment
given by the Board in Wheeling Steel Corporation,9 that a company
union, once started, without further action on the part of the employer,
may be an effective power device for him because "Even though he
would not have freely chosen the council (company union) as an ini-
tial proposition, the employee once having chosen, may, by force of a
279 CONG. Rzc. 7570 (1935).
24 For a discussion of these, see Wettach, Unfair Labor Practices Under the
Wagner Act (1938) 5 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 223; The Labor
Board and the Courts (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 568.
-251 N.L.R.B. 7, 11-15, l.c. 15.
26 See also Inland Steel Company (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 66 in which the Board
declared on page 32 that because of the sponsorship and economic support of
the company union "That organization cannot, in view of the circumstances,
operate as a true representative of the employees, and we shall order it
disestablished."
-1 N.L.R.B. 316 (1936).
28 1 N.L.RtB. 328 (1936).
291 N.L.R.B. 699 (1936).
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timorous habit, be held firmly to his choice. The employee must be
released from these unlawful compulsions." This was recently
reiterated in Inland Steel Company, where the Board found that "The
unlawful refusal to bargain collectively and the sponsorship of a com-
pany-dominated union necessarily disrupt the morale of the men, crip-
pling the membership drive of the bona fide union and making serious
inroads on membership already gained."' " This might be termed the
criterion of psychological necessity for disestablishment when, under a
shallower analysis, a "cease and desist" order would seem to be suffi-
cient. It must always be remembered, however, that the power of the
Board extends only to reestablishing the status quo, had the wrongs
not been committed.3 '
Whether the circuit court of appeals was justified in refusing the
order to disestablish in the Remington Rand case is not easy to say.
There is no strong evidence that the unions were being actively inter-
fered with or fostered by the management after the strike. At the
same time, the court's doubt that Rand paid the expenses of the back-
to-work associations during the strike seems difficult to sustain when
there was no indication of any other means of financing-no dues, con-
tributions, or requests for any, and many expenditures-particularly
when all was so dearly shown to be a part of Rand's strike-breaking
scheme. The court's opinion that the order to disestablish does not
add anything to the order to withdraw all recognition from the unions
(the latter on the ground that another representative had been elected)
is not necessarily exact, when one considers the "psychological" aspect.
Although the court does recognize this in some degr'ee by its statement
that the order might "impress an unfair stigma on these unions,"'
which shows clearly on which side the court throws the burden of
the possible unfairness.
The aforementioned criteria explain why the Supreme Court did
not weigh heavily the argument of both circuit courts of appeals in the
Greyhound Cases, that the Board was not warranted in disestablish-
ing a union before an election of the bargaining agency. Theoretically,
perhaps, since the purpose of the Board is to protect the union chosen
by the employees as a collective bargaining agent and the employees
are free to choose a plant union, this would seen logical; but realisti-
cally it is the actual free choice of the employees over which the Board
must watch, and correct abuses thereof even though not occurring on
election day. When these abuses are supported by evidence, it is our
contention that the Board has a very wide power of disestablishment.3
CHARLOTTE ANSCHUETZ.
30 6 N.L.R.B., No. 66, p. 33.
31NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 872 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938); In-
land Steel Company (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 66, p. 33; NLRB SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT (1937) p. 144.
32NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 870 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
33 Some recent cases of disestablishment are: Tiny Town Togs, Inc. (1938)
7 N.L.R.B., No. 10; Art Crayon Company, Inc. (1938) 7 N.L.R.B., No. 17;
The Hoover Co. (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 110; David E. Kennedy, Inc. (1938)
6 N.L.R.B., No. 111; Arthur L. Colton and A. J. Colman, Co-Partners, doing
Business as Kiddie Kover Manufacturing Company, (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No.
54; Kelly Springfield Tire Co. (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 53; The Griswold
Manufacturing Company, (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 49; Simplex Wire and
Cable Company, (1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 42; M. Lowenstein and Sons, Inc.,
(1938) 6 N.L.R.B., No. 37; Trenton-Philadelphia Coach Co. (1938) 6 N.L.R.B.,
No. 25.
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